Index
1. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
2. RevCon: Cycle, PrepComs, role, participants
3. Three decisions of 1995 RevCon
4. 13 steps of 2000 RevCon
5. NWS, NAM, NAC, EU
6. Article IV
7. Article VI
8. International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA)
9. IAEA-Safeguards and Additional Protocols
10. Iran’s nuclear program
11. Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)
12. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
13. Universality
14. Negative Security Assurances
15. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
16. Nuclear Weapons Convention
17. Nuclear Posture Review
18. NATO Nuclear Sharing
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
...is what this is all about. Signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, by now 189 of 192 countries have adhered to it (188 since North Korea left it in 2003). In essence, the treaty comprehends an interdiction for Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons. This is a major intrusion into the equality of sovereign states postulated in international law, the so-called discriminating element of the NPT: while it is OK for some to have nuclear weapons, others cannot acquire them. In order to lure states, normally reluctant to give up parts of their sovereignty, into the treaty, article IV guarantees extensive help and cooperation in the development of civil nuclear energy, while article VI states a commitment by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to eventually abolish nuclear weapons once and for all (article VI, NPT).
Download the complete treaty from the IAEA-database.
Here’s a video with a general overview of the NPT.
And a converted general’s perspective!
All Videos explaining the NPT are provided here at the About NPT topics-section!
RevCon: cycle, preps, role, participants
The NPT does not have a standing secretariat or organization for day-to-day matters, which is why the monitoring work is done by the IAEA, while all political questions surrounding the NPT and possible modifications are left to Review Conferences, which are held in a 5-year cycle. In the 3 years leading up to a RevCon, Preparatory Committees are held in order to prepare the actual RevCon, recommend a provisional agenda and choose a chair.
All 188 state-parties to the treaty have the right to participate at RevCons, with only few Small Island Development States renouncing to do so.
The RevCons have the power, with consensus, to declare (through a final document) what further action is to be taken, change or amend the treaty and give binding interpretations of articles to the treaty.
For example, in 1995, the treaty was prolonged indefinitely (after an initial duration of 25 years), as part of the 3 decision of ’95; in 2000, the 13 steps were adopted as a roadmap towards the aim of nuclear disarmament. The discussions for changes in 2010 include regulations for the withdrawal from the treaty (western countries state that only states in compliance with their NPT-obligations should be eligible to leave), further and more concrete steps towards disarmament, the wish by the west to make additional protocols the standard for all states parties to the NPT, Iran’s wish to ban form the IAEA-board of governors states that threaten to use nuclear weapons (i.e. the US), among others.
Watch also Beatrice Fihn’s introduction,, expectations as well as view on key players of the RevCon.
All Videos about the ongoing RevCon are provided here in the topics-section!
The decisions of 1995 and the 13 steps of 2000 were reaffirmed in the unanimously adopted final document of the 2010 Review Conference on Mayx 28th.
1. Unlimited extension of the treaty (NNWS give up the possibility to push NWS into steps towards disarmament by threatening to let the treaty and its non-proliferation effects expire. In return NNWS clearly and repeatedly reaffirm commitment to article VI and a resolution on the Middle East, i.e. an unusually explicit acknowledgement of Israel’s weapons, which the US would normally not agree to refer to.)
2. “Strengthening the review process”: 3 Preparatory Committees, 3 Main Committees in RevCons, subsidiary bodies to be established as needed, evaluation of past implementation as well as specific ways to improve it.
3. Reaffirmation of principles and objectives: sign CTBT, universality (all states should adhere to NPT), non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones to be encouraged, Negative Security Assurances welcomed (UN-SC Resolution 984, 1995), urge non-NPT states to sign IAEA-Safeguards, peaceful use of nuclear energy is an inalienable right.
See the full 1995 NPT Review Conference Package of Decisions on the Reaching Critical Will-website.
The decisions of 1995 and the 13 steps of 2000 were reaffirmed in the unanimously adopted final document of the 2010 Review Conference on Mayx 28th.
1. Sign the Comprehensive-Nuclear Test‐Ban Treaty (CTBT)
2. Stop Testing
3. Negotiate towards a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material (FMCT).
4. Establish subsidiary body in the CD (permanent Conference on Disarmament, Geneva) dealing with nuclear disarmament
5. Respect principle of irreversibility (no going back)
6. Abolish existing Nuclear Weapons (Article VI)
7. Implement START I (expired), START II (not ratified by Russian Duma), New START (signed April 8th), ABM (withdrawal by Bush-administration, 2003)
8. Declare quantity of excessive military fissile material
9. Unilateral reduction of NWS-arsenals, increased transparency, de-alerting (and disassembling), diminish role in security doctrines, engagement in process leading to abolition of nuclear weapons.
10. Weapons grade material (HEU, highly enriched uranium with over 80% of U235 as well as Plutonium) under IAEA control
11. General and complete disarmament as the ultimate objective
12. Regular reports by all states on the implementation of article IV & VI.
13. Development of verification capabilities (also in order to build the necessary confidence)
See the full account on the promises of the 2000 NPT Review Conference on the Reaching Critical Will-website.
Videos on states within groups and alliances are to be found here in the topics section!
Plus, a separate section on the USA here..
The Nuclear Weapon States (as opposed to NNWS, Non-Nuclear Weapon States) include, in the order of the number of their warheads: Russia, United States, France, China, Great Britain, Israel (which has never officially stated that it possesses any), India, Pakistan, North Korea (the latter three are not parties to the NPT). They share a strong emphasis on non-proliferation (articles I & II) and a reluctance for disarmament, actually their only commitment under the NPT.
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is the biggest group of states at the RevCons, originally composed by states that had aligned with neither the communist nor the US-led block during the Cold War, and are now composed by developing and emerging states keen to strengthen civil use cooperation (article IV) and reluctant to make further steps in non-proliferation, seen as undermining article IV.
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) is a group of like-minded states who pursue progressive disarmament-policies. They provide many working papers and have a constructive approach towards Global Zero. Member states are Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.
The European Union gives a united statement in the General Assembly (this time delivered by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton), though the positions of the various member states can hardly be reconciled in nuclear matters, as the EU is composed by both two NWS (Fr, GB) as well as three members of the NAC (Sweden, Slovenia, Ireland).
See also videos on France’s position as well as the Obama-administrations stand on nuclear issues
Videos on states within groups and alliances are to be found here in the topics section!
Civil use of nuclear energy constitutes an unalienable right of every state. NWS should provide cooperation for NNWS to achieve peaceful nuclear programs:
All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in. the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes […]
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
Watch the Obama-effect on disarmament.
All Videos concerning the way to Global Zero are gathered here in the topics-section!
The International Atomic Energy Authority, an international body independent but reporting to the UN, monitors NNWS’ compliance with the treaty through safeguards, separate treaties to be signed between the states and the IAEA. The IAEA gives technical assistance with the development of peaceful nuclear programs and monitors these in order to avoid parts of it being diverted for military purposes. The IAEA is a technical, non-political body. In its fact-sheet in preparation of the 2010 RevCon, the IAEA states that both Iran and Syria are currently not in compliance with their Safeguards-obligations.
IAEA-Safeguards and Additional Protocols
Article III.2 NPT states that certain substances and materials may be delivered only to states implementing safeguards, or will trigger safeguards if exported (the so-called Trigger-list is compiled by the Zangger-committee, an amplified version of it is used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG). IAEA-Safeguards are contracts states sign with the IAEA and provide the legal basis for the IAEA’s inspections. These include detailed accounts of nuclear materials entering and leaving NNWS’ civilian nuclear facilities, physical protection of the stored nuclear material and surveillance by seals and CCTV-cameras.
Additional Protocols go further in their requirements and were meant as a means of confidence building when introduced in 1993. They enable the IAEA to carry out spontaneous inspections, also for facilities not listed in official lists, and take probes of whatever materials, not only declared ones. The EU and Canada want to set these as the standard procedure, which is opposed by most NAM states and has no real chance of realization. As of 2010, 133 countries have signed them, while 104 have so far implemented them.
All Videos on the Iranian nuclear program are provided here in the topics-section!
In 1970, Iran joins the NPT, under the Shah-regime, and soon undertakes a civil nuclear program with US-backing. After the revolution in 1979 and the war against Iraq, the facilities that were under construction are severely damaged. During the 90ies, Russian companies undertake to rebuild a reactor from the remains.
In 2002/03 it becomes clear that Iran had failed to declare materials as well as nuclear facilities in Arak and Natanz, a great blow to confidence in their nuclear program. In 2003 additional protocols are signed, but not ratified, though already implemented, enrichment is stopped. In 2005, enrichment is being restarted, in 2006 the IAEA board of governors hands the case to the UN Security Council, which declares further enrichment illegal. Iran denounces the handing over to the UNSC itself as illegal and pledges to ignore the ruling, while dropping implementation of additional protocols. As a reaction, the UNSC imposes a first round of sanctions, to be followed by others. 2007 the National Intelligence Estimate (all of the US’ intelligence agencies) sees Iran as being 3 to 10 years away of the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. A lost Iranian official’s laptop examined by the IAEA in 2010 revealed Iran’s enrichment capabilities to not overtake 20% (90% needed for weapons). The enrichment facility currently under construction in Qom, without IAEA-knowledge (yet another severe breach of the safeguards) is thought to be high-enriching.
Iran aches under the discriminatory nature of the NPT, why are they allowed to possess nuclear weapons while others aren’t? Yet under the rules of the NPT, to which Iran adhered, Iran has no right whatsoever to nuclear weapons. This is not disputed by Iran, accordingly, Iran has consistently denied the existence of a military nuclear program, yet sometimes said they could, if they wanted to. The supreme leader Ali Chamene’i has repeatedly underlined the teachings of Islam forbid nuclear weapons and that Iran could, consequently, never acquire them.
Yet it is understandable that Iran feels a threat from Israel, its nuclear armed neighbor, while Israel fears Iran due to its president’s anti-Zionist and at time anti-Semite rhetoric. The number of enrichment facilities announced is also far too high for civil purposes, while Iran’s stubbornness in enriching its own Uranium seems suspicious. Furthermore, Iran pursues a strong program of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), which can either be used to place satellites in orbit (as the regime claims), or to deliver nuclear warheads (ICBMs are far too expensive to use with conventional weapons), a classic dual-use problem.
Iran actually has a right to every means of help and cooperation with its civil nuclear program under article IV, NPT. But Iran had this right only as long as in compliance with IAEA-Safeguards, which it is, according to the IAEA itself, no longer.
“If he [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] brings some good constructive proposal in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, that will be helpful, the onus is on you, and you have not satisfied the requirements of the international community that your nuclear development program is for peaceful purposes, as you claim.”
All Videos on the Iranian nuclear program are provided here in the topics-section!
The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has been signed in 1996, as scheduled in the ‘95 RevCon decisions, but the US-senate has failed to ratify it, as the senate already had a republican majority in spite of the democratic president Clinton. China and many others have not ratified it either, with reference to the US not having done so. Indonesia now took a positive step forward, pursuing ratification all the same, within the context of new hope the US senate may ratify the CTBT by 2011, which Obama has pledged. The CTBTO, the treaty’s organization, is based in Vienna and is pursuing its work as a “Preparatory Commission”, due to the need for entry into force of the treaty prior to the founding of the organization. Still, its International Monitoring System is already operational, including, once completed, 170 seismic monitoring stations, 11 hydro-acoustic stations, 60 infra-red stations and 80 radio-nuclide stations all pursuing the aim of monitoring nuclear activities carried out in breach of the treaty. The systems partly publish their findings online and have been used for the monitoring of many earthquakes and seaquakes, most notably during the tsunami of 2004.
See also our video-interview with Jean Du Preez of the CTBTO!
All Videos on the CTBT are provided here in the topics-section!
The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is a proposed treaty aiming at stopping all high-enrichment of Uranium and separation of Plutonium (e.g. from spent nuclear fuels). This way, the production of new fissile materials and the risk of proliferation as well as the barrier to disarmament constituted by these is supposed to be diminished. A call for a FMCT is included in the 13 steps of the 200 RevCon and considered to be a valuable part of any comprehensive strategy towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Obama has called for a FMCT in his famous Prague speech.
Treaties such as the NPT need to be universal in order to carry out their purpose, especially if complete worldwide disarmament is to be achieved. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are currently not parties to the treaty. Yet in order to enter, they would have to destroy all of their nuclear weapons, as they could only join as NNWS: the treaty defines as an official NWS only such states that carried out nuclear tests prior to January 1st, 1967. This is supposed to keep states from withdrawing from the treaty as NNWS and re-entering as NWS. However, it also means that universality cannot be achieved in the short term, as the continuing tensions between Israel and Iran, Pakistan and India and the two Koreas linger on, which has made many call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
NSA should be a self-evident pledge of the NWS towards the NNWS. If a discriminatory treaty such as the NPT keeps states from acquiring “adequate” protection from nuclear weapons, than these states should not have to fear be confronted with such horrendous threats altogether. All NWS have expressed some kind of security assurance. Still, no country has proclaimed one as comprehensive and progressive as the People’s Republic of China, which has even given Positive Security Assurances (PSA) to any state, by that declaring it will assist NNWS that fall victim of a nuclear attack. The US have, with Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review of 6th April 2010, made a considerable improvement to their NSA, stating they would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS, but making some significant exceptions: states not party to the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea), states in breach of their NPT-obligations (Iran, Syria) and states that carry out severe chemical or biological attacks on US-soil. However, such constraints have traditionally been employed to urge states to adhere to the NPT.
NSAs would constitute major confidence-building measures and strengthen non-proliferation.
See also UN-SC Resolution 984 of 1995 on the issue of NSAs.
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are encouraged by the treaty. They have been established in South America, ASEAN (Southeastern Asia), Mongolia (a one-country NWFZ), Central Asia (primarily former soviet republics), South Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand) and Africa (this one is a de-facto NWFZ, but has not been acknowledged by all states of the region). The establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East (and thus the acknowledgement that someone, namely Israel, must have nuclear weapons) is part of the outcomes of the 1995 RevCon, but has not showed any results so far. NWFZ should be recognized by NWS, in order to guarantee that they will not threaten their nuclear weapon free status, which they have not yet done.
Find all videos on NWFZ in our topics-section!
The NWC is one of the most discussed topics of the 2010 RevCon. It is a convention that would ban nuclear weapons, similarly to the Ottawa Convention on Landmines or the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The convention would include control and inspection mechanisms that would make sure, once all NWS are in, that nuclear disarmament would be pursued. The Pros in relation to the NPT include the possibility to engage the de-facto NWS that are not parties to the NPT, a stronger emphasis on disarmament than in the NPT, the possibility to postulate concrete deadlines, and the creation of a framework with effective control mechanisms (none of this has yet been outlined in a concrete manner).
Arguments against a NWC include the timing (many say that Russia and the US have to reach the number of warheads of the other NWS in order to engage them into disarmament), a feared undermining of the NPT and its non-proliferation effects, a fear not to be able to convince the de-facto NWS to join (especially in regard of unsettled regional issues such as the partition of Korea, the unresolved dispute of Israel and the not-yet established state of Palestine, the rivalry of Iran and Israel as well as the one between India and Pakistan).
There are massive campaigns in favor of a NWC going on at the moment: ICAN
Also be sure to watch Beatrice Fihn explaining the NWC on NPT TV, as well as the Chairman of the whole conference with Right Livelihood Award Laureate Alyn Ware debating the benefits of a NWC.
All Videos on the NWC are provided here in the topics-section!
The Nuclear Posture is the military doctrine of the US concerning the role of nuclear weapons within the defense strategy. It thus defines when nuclear weapons are an option to use. Obama’s review of this posture, the NPR, was issued the 6th of April, as part of a big launch of nuclear issues from the part of the US-administration, along with the signing of the New START treaty (8th of April), the Nuclear Security Summit (12th/13th of April, biggest gathering of heads of state in the US since the foundation of the UN in 1945) in a run-up to the 2010 RevCon currently held in New York.
The NPR turned out to be far less progressive than was expected after initial remarks by President Obama, due mostly to compromises that had to be made in order to get the New START treaty ratified in the Senate, where Republicans could easily have blocked it. Consequently, the NPR refrains from giving a full Negative Security Assurance, granting it exclusively to those NNWS who are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their NPT-obligations (without stating clearly that the IAEA, and not the US, are to interpret whether a state fulfills these or not), yet also reserving the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against states that launch major biological or chemical attacks on US-soil. Also, the NPR does not contain an action plan regarding NATO nuclear sharing in Europe. Moreover, the NPR grants more money to the modernization than the Bush-administration had done and allegedly contains funds for new research sites over nuclear weapons (related interview soon to be added).
New START-ratification is still not granted. CTBT-ratification is waiting in line.
Read the full NPR online.
Or have James Goodby explain the NPR to you!
All Videos on the 2010 NPR are provided here in the topics-section!
Nuclear Sharing is the practice, within NATO, to station American tactical nuclear weapons (currently B-61) in US-bases on European soil and, most importantly, have local soldiers and pilots train the dropping of such bombs. If the US-President gave authorizaion, NATO would allow Germany, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy to drop American nuclear weapons. Most state parties to the NPT consider this to be in breach with articles I and II of the NPT (not passing on such weapons, not receiving such weapons, respectively). This can hardly be denies and thus undermines the NPT.
The agreements with NATO had first started as a means to deter the Sowjet Union in spite of their past superiority in terms of conventional forces and have now no military role whatsoever, though a political role is asserted to them: “glueing” the alliance together through the sharing of the burden that the abjection, that the threatening of an actual use of nuclear weapons constitutes. Most of the states do not want to host nuclear weapons, but have considerable problems getting of them. For an in-depths look into the issues surrounding Nuclear Sharing, check out our great video with Paul Ingram!
All Videos on NATO Nuclear Sharing are provided here in the topics-section!
Final Doc: for Humanity & NGOs
Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute
Judging the Final Document
Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
Always the Next Generation
Natasha Barnes, NGO Adviser to New Zealand Delegation
Is Consensus possible?
Anne Penketh, BASIC
NAM on Discrimination
Pardohadiningrat Sudjadnan, Ambassador of Indonesia (NAM)
Turkey explains deal with Brazil & Iran
Tacan Ildem, Ambassador of Turkey
National Positions vs. State Alliances
García Moritán, Ambassador of Argentina
Nuclear Energy as a solution for Africa
Boniface G. Chidyausiku, Ambassador of Zimbabwe, Chair of the 2009 PrepCom
Ban Ki-moon’s 5-Point-Plan
Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative on Disarmament Affairs
USA on Nuclear Weapons Complex-Investments
Glyn T. Davies, Ambassador of the USA
New Draft, as of May 27th
Ray Acheson, Program Director of Reaching Critical Will
Swiss NPT
Jürg Lauber, Ambassador of Switzerland
Mexico sees NGOs as Allies
Pablo Macedo, Ambassador of Mexico
"Countdown to Zero" movie preview.
Hollywood rocks the nuclear people!
This FAQ provides an overview of the most frequently used abbreviations of the NPT community.
A focus on the strong women working on this – far too long exclusively male - issue.
Update and preview on the latest videos from our newest members aboard!
We’re a team of students from Germany. We’ve been working to bring you easily digestible video updates on the state of nuclear disarmament since 2007.
Since then, we’ve produced over 500 interviews with NGOs and diplomats reporting on the proceedings of NPT conferences and examining underlying issues.
This is the 2010 edition of NPT TV, and we’re working hard to keep you updated even through the frenetic run-up to the final document being negotiated, so stay tuned!
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Special Thanks
Peter Kolbe
German United Nations Association
